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THE INTERPRETATION-CONSTRUCTION
DISTINCTION*
Lawrence B. Solum**
INTRODUCTION
The interpretation-construction distinction, which marks the
difference between linguistic meaning and legal effect, is much
1
discussed these days. I shall argue that the distinction is both
real and fundamental—that it marks a deep difference in two
different stages (or moments) in the way that legal and political
actors process legal texts. My account of the distinction will not
be precisely the same as some others, but I shall argue that it is
the correct account and captures the essential insights of its
2
rivals. This Essay aims to mark the distinction clearly.
The basic idea can be explained by distinguishing two
different moments or stages that occur when an authoritative
* 2010 by the Author. Permission is hereby granted to make copies of this work,
or any portion thereof, for classroom or scholarly use. I owe thanks to comments and
suggestions from participants at the annual meeting of the Australian Society of Legal
Philosophy, at the Constitutional Law Colloquium, at Northwestern University School of
Law, at the Works-in-Progress Conference, Center for the Study of Constitutional
Originalism of the University of San Diego, at the Program on the InterpretationConstruction Distinction in Constitutional Law of the Section on Constitutional Law at
the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, and at faculty
workshops at Melbourne Law School, Willamette University College of Law, Boston
University School of Law, Fordham University School of Law, and the University of
Tulsa College of Law.
** John E. Cribbet Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, University of
Illinois.
1. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods
Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 751 (2009); Ingrid Wuerth, An Originalism for Foreign Affairs?, 53 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 5, 12–18 (2008); Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the “Challenge Of Change”:
Abduced-Principle Originalism and Other Mechanisms by Which Originalism Sufficiently
Accommodates Changed Social Conditions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 927, 961–62 (2009);
Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 63 (2009); Reva B.
Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV.
1399, 1410–12 (2009).
2. This Essay is related to ideas developed in Semantic Originalism, which offers a
general theory of constitutional interpretation. See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic
Originalism (Ill. Pub Law Research Paper No. 07-24, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244.
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legal text (a constitution, statute, regulation, or rule) is applied
or explicated. The first of these moments is interpretation—
which I shall stipulate is the process (or activity) that recognizes
or discovers the linguistic meaning or semantic content of the
legal text. The second moment is construction—which I shall
stipulate is the process that gives a text legal effect (either my
translating the linguistic meaning into legal doctrine or by
applying or implementing the text). I shall then claim that the
difference between interpretation and construction is real and
fundamental. Although the terminology (the words “interpretation” and “construction” that express the distinction) could
vary, legal theorists cannot do without the distinction.
One more preliminary point: the topic of this Essay is
narrow and conceptual. This Essay has three goals: (1) to
explicate the nature of the interpretation-construction
distinction, (2) to argue that this distinction marks a real
difference, and (3) to suggest that the distinction is helpful in
that it enables legal theorists to clarify the nature of important
debates, for example debates about constitutional interpretation.
The Essay does not offer any particular theory of interpretation
or construction—that it is, it remains agnostic about questions as
to how linguistic meaning can be discerned or how legal content
ought to be determined. Nor does this theory offer an account of
the history and origins of the distinction. Those topics are
important, but raising them in this Essay might shift attention
away from prior questions about the nature and value of the
distinction itself.
Here is the roadmap. In Part II, this Essay shall discuss two
preliminary sets of ideas: (1) vagueness and ambiguity, and (2)
semantic content and legal content. In Part III, this Essay shall
use these preliminary ideas to answer the questions, “What is
interpretation?” and “What is construction?” In Part IV, this
Essay shall consider some objections to the interpretationconstruction distinction. In Part V, this Essay shall develop the
argument that the distinction is fundamental and indispensible.
II. TWO PRELIMINARY SETS OF IDEAS
Before we get to the distinction itself, we need to examine
two related distinctions. The first of these is the distinction
between vagueness and ambiguity; the second distinction is
between semantic content and legal content.
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A. VAGUENESS AND AMBIGUITY
When we communicate via language (written or oral), we
use words and phrases that can be formed into complex
expressions using the rules of syntax and grammar. Sometimes
the smallest meaningful unit of expression is a single word;
sometimes, whole phrases carry meanings that cannot be
decomposed into the meaning of constituent words. But
whatever the relevant unit of meaning might be (words, phrases,
sentences, or whole utterances), texts can be either vague or
ambiguous.
In ordinary speech, the distinction between vagueness and
ambiguity is not always observed. The two terms are sometimes
used interchangeably, and, when this is the case, they both mark
a general lack of what we might call “determinacy” (or “clarity”
or “certainty”) of meaning. But the terms “vague” and
“ambiguous” also have technical (or more precise) meanings,
3
such that there is a real difference in their meaning.
In the technical sense, ambiguity refers to the multiplicity of
4
sense: a term is ambiguous if it has more than one sense. A
classic example is the word “cool.” In one sense “cool” means
low temperature, as in “the room was so cool we could see our
5
breath.” In another sense, “cool” means something like hip or
6
stylish, as in “Miles Davis was so cool that every young trumpet
7
player imitated him.” And “cool” has several other senses—
3. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary offers the following definition of
“vague”: “Of words, language, etc.: Not precise or exact in meaning.” OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989), available at http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/
50274390?query_type=word&queryword=vague&first=1&max_to_show=10&sort_type=
alpha&search_id=02Yl-2mHK6d-2502&result_place=1. And it offers the following
definition of “ambiguous”: “Doubtful, questionable; indistinct, obscure, not clearly
defined.” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989), available at
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50006932?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=a
mbiguous&first=1&max_to_show=10.
4. Thus, the third definition in the Oxford English Dictionary is “Capability of
being understood in two or more ways; double or dubious signification, ambiguousness.”
OXFORD
ENGLISH
DICTIONARY
(2d
ed.
1989),
available
at
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50006931?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=a
mbiguity&first=1&max_to_show=10.
5. As in the following definition: “Of or at a relatively low temperature;
moderately cold, esp. agreeably or refreshingly so (in contrast with heat or cold).”
OXFORD
ENGLISH
DICTIONARY
(2d
ed.
1989),
available
at
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50049434?query_type=word&queryword=cool&first=
1&max_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&search_id=02Yl-pvqbdQ-2524&result_place=1.
6. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary offers this definition: “Attractively
shrewd or clever; sophisticated, stylish, classy; fashionable, up to date; sexually
attractive.” Id.
7. The utterance in text is actually ambiguous as between the “hip” sense of cool

!!!SOLUM-271-INTERPRETATION-CONSTRUCTIONDISTINCTION.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)12/10/2010 10:48 AM

98

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 27:95

referring to temperament or self-control, to certain colors, and a
lack of enthusiasm (or the presence of skepticism or mild
hostility).
The technical sense of vagueness refers to the existence of
borderline cases: a term is vague if there are cases where the
8
term might or might not apply. A classic example is the word
“tall.” In one sense, “tall” refers to height (of a person or other
entity) that is higher (in some way or to some degree) than
average. Abraham Lincoln was tall: at almost 6’4” he was
certainly tall for an adult male of his time. Napoleon was not tall,
although at 5’6” he was of average height for his time. There are
persons who are clearly tall and clearly not tall, but there are
also borderline cases. For example, in the United States in the
twenty-first century, males who are 5’11” or 5’10 ½” are neither
clearly tall nor clearly not. Finally, a given word or phrase can be
both vague and ambiguous. “Cool” is ambiguous, and, in the
temperature sense, it is also vague.
Getting ahead of ourselves for a moment, ambiguities in
legal texts can (usually) be resolved by interpretation, but
constitutional vagueness always requires construction.
B. SEMANTIC CONTENT AND LEGAL CONTENT
The second preliminary distinction that we need to make is
9
between semantic content and legal content. Legal texts that are
currently valid in an actual legal system that is currently in
10
force have both kinds of content. The semantic content of a
legal text is simply the linguistic meaning of the text. For
example, the First Amendment freedom of speech has a
and a more specific sense that refers to a style of jazz associated with Davis: “Of jazz
music: restrained or relaxed in style (opposed to HOT adj. 12h). Also: performing or
associated with music of this type.” Id. So the sentence in text might be asserting that
Davis was very hip, or that his playing was relaxed in style.
8. See Roy Sorensen, Vagueness, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Aug. 29,
2006) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vagueness/ (“There is wide agreement that a term
is vague to the extent that it has borderline cases.”); see also TIMOTHY ENDICOTT,
VAGUENESS IN THE LAW (2000); ROSANNA KEEFE, THEORIES OF VAGUENESS (2000);
TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, VAGUENESS (1994); Roy Sorensen, Vagueness Has No Function
in Law, 7 LEGAL THEORY 387 (2001).
9. For the purpose of this paper, the phrase “legal text” is meant to be quite
general and to refer, for example, to contracts, wills, trust instruments, patents, rules,
regulations, statutes, constitutions, and opinions.
10. Of course, there can be legal texts that are no longer in force and legal systems
that no longer exist. And there are proposed legal texts that were never enacted, and
hypothetical legal texts that have never been proposed or enacted. In such cases, the
obsolescent or unenacted legal texts have no currently operative legal content, although
they still have semantic content.
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linguistic meaning, associated with the meanings of the
constituent words and phrases—“Congress,” “shall make,” “no,”
“law,” “abridging,” “the freedom of speech,” and further
specified by the conventions of syntax and grammar that allow
these words and phrases to be combined into a meaningful
whole. This same provision is the source of legal content that is
not identical to its semantic content. As examples, consider the
following doctrines that are connected to the First Amendment:
(1) the prior restraint doctrine, (2) the rules that define the
freedom of speech doctrine governing expression via billboards,
and (3) the distinction between content-based regulations and
11
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions. These
three rules are part of the legal content of free-speech doctrine,
but these doctrines are not part of the linguistic meaning of the
expression “Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom
12
of speech.”
Although I believe this point about the difference (between
the linguistic meaning of the text and the legal effect that text is
given by free speech doctrine) is obvious, it might be
misunderstood. The point that I am making is that the text of the
First Amendment says nothing about “billboards,” “prior
restraint,” “content,” or “time, place, and manner.” These
doctrinal ideas are not found in the linguistic meaning or
semantic content of the text. The claim that the semantic content
of the First Amendment does not contain this legal content does
not (logically or conceptually) imply the further claim that the
legal content of these doctrines cannot be derived from an
appropriate theory of the purpose of the freedom of speech.
Sometimes the word “meaning” is used to refer to the purpose
of a legal text, but that sense of the word “meaning” is not the
same as linguistic meaning.
One characteristic of semantic content is especially
important: the linguistic meaning of a text is a fact about the
world. The meaning of written or oral communication is
determined by a set of facts: these facts include the
characteristics of the utterance itself—what marks appear in the
writing?—and by facts about linguistic practice—how is that
word used?—and—what are the ‘rules’ (or regularities) of syntax
and grammar? The linguistic meaning of an utterance cannot be
11. For a brief overview of free-speech doctrine, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 921–1180 (2006).
12. It might be argued that these doctrines are a necessary implication of the
linguistic meaning, but I shall set that possibility aside here.
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settled by arguments of morality or political theory. For this
reason, it would involve a category mistake to argue directly for
a conclusion about the linguistic meaning of an utterance on the
basis of a moral premise.
Once again, we can jump ahead: interpretation yields
semantic content, whereas construction determines legal content
or legal effect.
III. INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
We have now distinguished ambiguity from vagueness and
semantic content from legal content; these two preliminary
moves set the stage for articulating the distinction between
interpretation and construction.
A. WHAT IS INTERPRETATION?
The interpretation-construction distinction reentered general
legal theory in the context of debates over constitutional practice
via the work of what are sometimes called the “New
14
Originalists,” particularly Keith Whittington and Randy
15
Barnett. As I discuss the distinction, I will use constitutional
interpretation and construction in an illustrative context, but the
distinction itself applies whenever an authoritative legal text is
applied or explicated.
In general, interpretation recognizes or discovers the
linguistic meaning of an authoritative legal text. Contract
interpretation yields the linguistic meaning of the contract.
Patent interpretation yields the semantic content of the patent

13. Normative considerations may be relevant to linguistic meaning. For example, if
faced with an ambiguous utterance, there may be contexts in which the normatively more
attractive meaning is more likely the meaning intended by the speaker. But in cases like
this, we do not reach the conclusion that the normatively attractive meaning is the true
meaning because it is morally better. Rather, we infer than the author more likely
intended the meaning because it was morally attractive. For example, if someone says “I
would kill for some ice cream right now,” the utterance is ambiguous as between a literal
meaning and a figurative meaning, in which the expression “I would kill” signifies an
intense desire and not a prediction about taking the life of another human being. The
moral wrongness of killing may be part of the reason for rejecting the morally
unattractive literal interpretation, but the role of morality in cases like this is indirect. If
we had reason to believe the literal meaning were the actual meaning (for example, if the
person making the statement was a psychopath who had killed for ice cream in the past),
then the moral wrongness of the literal interpretation might become irrelevant.
14. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (1999); KEITH
E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1999).
15. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004).
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claims. Statutory interpretation yields the linguistic meaning of
statutory texts.
Because my own work on the interpretation-construction
distinction occurs mostly in constitutional theory, I will use the
text of the United States Constitution as an illustrative example.
In the constitutional context, interpretation is the activity that
aims at discovery of the linguistic meaning of the various articles
and amendments that form the United States Constitution.
Constitutional interpretation yields the semantic content of the
Constitution. Constitutional theorists may disagree about how
this occurs. Original-Intentions Originalists may believe that the
semantic content of the Constitution was fixed by the intentions
of the Framers or ratifiers. Original-public-meaning Originalists
may believe that the linguistic meaning of the Constitution is the
meaning that the constitutional text had to the competent
speakers of American English at the time the Constitution was
framed and ratified. Some Living Constitutionalists may believe
that the meaning of the Constitution is fixed by contemporary
16
usage at the time interpretation occurs. In other words, there
are various theories of constitutional interpretation—in the
sense that the interpretation-construction distinction gives that
phrase “constitutional interpretation”—but all of these theories
aim at the recovery of the linguistic meaning of the
constitutional text.
In practice, interpretation responds to a variety of
interpretative problem types—recurring situations in which we
are in doubt about the linguistic meaning of the Constitution.
For example, some constitutional language may be archaic—the
meaning of the phrase “domestic violence” in the United States
Constitution (referring to violence, e.g., rebellions or riots
originating within the boundaries of a state) is not the same as
the use of that phrase in contemporary writing to refer to
17
violence within families, such as spousal abuse. In such cases,
16. My view, which is not at issue in this paper, has two parts: (1) the linguistic
meaning of the Constitution was fixed by linguistic facts at the time each provision of the
Constitution was framed and ratified, and (2) the relevant linguistic facts focus on the
conventional semantic meanings of the relevant words and phrases and the patterns of
usage that can be summarized as so-called “rules” of syntax and grammar. Conventional
semantic meanings can be modified in four ways: (1) by the publicly available context of
constitutional utterance, (2) by the division of linguistic labor which may create “terms of
art,” (3) necessary implications of the semantic content of the text, and (4) constitutional
stipulations (or units of meaning created by the Constitution itself). This view is
developed and defended in depth in Solum, supra note 2.
17. For an illuminating discussion, see Mark S. Stein, The Domestic Violence Clause
in “New Originalist” Theory, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 129 (2009).
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Originalists believe that the problem of ascertaining the
linguistic meaning of the phrase can be resolved by resorting to
linguistic facts: for example, original-public-meaning Originalists
believe that the meaning of the phrase “natural born citizen” is
determined by patterns of usage during the period when the
18
Constitution of 1789 was drafted and ratified.
Another recurring problem of constitutional interpretation
is ambiguity. It is possible that some of the words and phrases
used in the Constitution are ambiguous (in the technical sense)
because they have more than one linguistic meaning. A text or
utterance that is ambiguous can frequently be disambiguated by
consideration of the context. An acontextual instance of the
word “cool” is ambiguous, but the sentence “the room was so
cool that I had to put on my sweater” provides sufficient context
to suggest that the relevant sense of “cool” is the temperature
sense. Likewise, the phrase “natural born citizens” might be
ambiguous as between “citizens whose birth was natural” and
“persons who citizenship was ‘natural’ because it resulted from
birth rather than artificial ‘naturalization’ by statute.” A resort
to context might rule out the former meaning, and thus settle the
semantic content of the Constitution as that given by the latter
meaning. Characteristically, constitutional ambiguity can be
resolved by interpretation that relies on the publicly available
context of the constitutional provision at issue to select among
the possible senses of the words and phrases of the text.
I say that ambiguity characteristically can be resolved by
interpretation, because it is not necessarily the case that all
ambiguities can be resolved by reference to context. There may
be cases where the available evidence about the context of an
utterance is insufficient to resolve an ambiguity. Or there may be
cases where an ambiguity in a legal text can be recognized as
intentional based on the publicly-available context of the
utterance, and there is no fact of that matter as to which of
multiple senses was the true or correct sense of the utterance. If
there are such cases of what we can call “irreducible ambiguity,”
then interpretation cannot resolve them.

18. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Natural Born Citizen Clause, 107
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 22 (2008), available at http://www.michiganlawreview.
org/assets/fi/107/ solum.pdf.
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B. WHAT IS CONSTRUCTION?
Conceptually, construction gives legal effect to the semantic
content of a legal text. Construction can occur in a variety of
contexts, and there are different modes of construction. One
important distinction can be marked by differentiating the
contexts in which construction can occur. For example, we can
distinguish judicial construction from political construction and
private construction. Courts engage in judicial construction when
they translate the linguistic meaning of a legal text into doctrine:
examples of judicial construction of the First Amendment were
discussed above. Judicial construction also occurs when the
effect to be given to semantic content of a legal text is
constrained or modified by higher-order legal rules. For
example, when a will violates the rule against perpetuities, a
court may give the will a saving construction—this construction
gives the will a legal effect that varies from the semantic content
of the text. Yet another example of judicial construction occurs
when a court simply translates the semantic content of the text
into corresponding legal content, and then applies that content
to a particular case—in such cases, the act of construction may
go unnoticed since it does no work in determining legal
19
content.
Courts are not the only entities that give effect to legal texts.
Consider, for example, the familiar notion of the Constitution
outside the courts. Various political institutions implement
constitutional provisions that are rarely, if ever, the subject of
judicial interpretation. The House and the Senate organized
themselves in accord with the text of Article I of the United
States Constitution, giving legal effect to the text without the aid
of judicial constructions: we can call activities like this “political
construction.” Likewise, private persons give legal effect to a
variety of authoritative legal texts, including statutes,
19. One might say that when a legal text is neither ambiguous nor vague, then
interpretation does all the work and no construction is required. There is nothing wrong
with speaking in this way, but given the definitions of “interpretation” and
“construction” that are stipulated in this Essay, construction is always a step in the
process of understanding and applying a legal text. The stipulated definition of
construction simply is that a legal practice is “construction” if it involves giving legal
effect to an authoritative legal text. Legal texts that are neither vague nor ambiguous are
given legal effect, and, hence, give rise to “construction” in the stipulated sense. Another
way of putting this point is to observe that the semantic content of a legal text that is
neither vague nor ambiguous is not the same thing as the legal content of the same text—
what we call “semantic content” is a different kind of thing than “legal content”—even
when the two kinds of content map directly onto each other. Linguistic meaning is one
kind of thing, but legal effect is a different kind of thing.
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regulations, and contracts. We can call activities like this
“private construction.”
Although political construction and private construction are
important, I want to focus on judicial construction of the
Constitution for illustrative purposes. When courts engage in
constitutional construction, they frequently translate the
semantic content of the constitutional text (its linguistic
meaning) into the legal content of constitutional doctrine (or
rules of constitutional law). For example, construction of the
First Amendment of the Constitution by the United States
Supreme Court yielded a complex set of legal doctrines—
including the examples (doctrines concerning billboards, prior
restraints, and “Time, Place, and Manner” restrictions) that were
mentioned above. On the surface, it seems obvious that the
content of constitutional doctrine is nonidentical with the
semantic content of the constitutional text—although one can
imagine an argument that the content of the doctrine is
somehow a logical implication of the content of the text and
obvious facts about the world.
Because interpretation aims at the recovery of linguistic
meaning, it is guided by linguistic facts—facts about patterns of
usage. Thus, we might say that interpretation is “value neutral,”
or only “thinly normative.” The correctness of an interpretation
does not depend on our normative theories about what the law
should be. But construction is not like interpretation in this
regard—the production of legal rules cannot be “value neutral”
because we cannot tell whether a construction is correct or
incorrect without resort to legal norms. And legal norms,
themselves, can only be justified by some kind of normative
argument.
For this reason, theories of construction are ultimately
normative theories: because constructions go beyond linguistic
meaning, the justification for a construction must include
premises that go beyond linguistic facts. This point can be
illustrated in the context of constitutional construction—
although similar points could be made about statutory
construction, contract construction, and so forth. Some
constitutional theorists may believe that constitutional
constructions should be justified on the basis of legal norms, e.g.,
by the rules of stare decisis or on the basis of a legal principle
that calls for deference to the political branches when the
constitutional text does not require a contrary result. Other
constitutional theorists may believe that explicitly nonlegal
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normative considerations enter into constitutional construction.
For example, Hart’s picture of the core and penumbra of legal
rules implies that, in borderline cases, judges must exercise
discretion, and such discretion could be exercised on the basis of
20
a theory of political morality.
The claim that theories of constitutional construction must
be normative does not imply that judges who engage in
constitutional construction must resort to their own beliefs about
21
morality or politics in particular cases. Consider, for example, a
theory of constitutional construction that began with normative
premises about the great value of the rule of law and the dangers
of politicization of constitutional adjudication. Such a theory
might argue that judges should adopt a principle of deference to
the political branches in those cases where invalidation of
legislative or executive action is not required by legal content
that is required by the semantic content of the Constitution. A
simpler articulation of that principle might be formulated in
terms of H.L.A. Hart’s distinction between the core and
penumbra: in the core, judges should follow the clear meaning of
the constitutional text, but, in the penumbra, they should defer
22
to the political branches. This theory of construction is justified
20. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 123 (2d ed. 1994).
21. Thus, I believe that John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport are in error when
they characterize “construction” as follows:
In the abstract, constructionist originalism requires that judges follow the
original meaning, but does not impose any legal requirements as to
construction. Because there is no legally required or even accepted method for
determining how to resolve questions of construction, judges are likely to
determine how to engage in construction based on their own views.
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 783. The question as to what legal standards
govern “construction” is complex, and a complete treatment is outside the scope of this
Essay, but two points can be made on this occasion. First, as “construction” is defined in
this Essay, it is clear that there are a variety of conventional legal standards that govern
construction. Construction is the activity of giving legal effect to an authoritative text: to
say that activity is lawless is tantamount to claiming that the law is radically
indeterminate, but that claim is implausible. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the
Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987). Second,
as a normative matter, those who embrace the interpretation-construction distinction can
argue for theories of construction (e.g., for Originalist theories of constitutional
construction) that do not allow judges to adopt constructions “based on their own
[normative] views.” McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 783. For example, one
might argue that constructions must be consistent with the purposes, functions, or goals
that motivated adoption of the text, and that judicial construction should be bound by
the doctrine of stare decisis. The point made in text is that theories of construction must
be justified on normative grounds, e.g., by arguments from legal norms, or by arguments
of political morality. When McGinnis and Rappaport argue against construction for
normative reasons, they implicitly recognize this point.
22. See Hart, supra note 20, at 123. Whether such deference is always possible is
questionable. For example, in cases that involve conflicts between the political branches,
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on normative grounds—in this case by the value of the rule of
law—but it does not authorize judges to use their own beliefs
about morality or politics to shape constitutional doctrine in
particular cases. This principle of construction would bear strong
23
resemblance to Thayer’s position.
Construction becomes obvious—it grabs our attention—in
cases in which the linguistic meaning of a legal text is vague.
Once we have determined that the semantic content of the text
is vague and that the case to be decided lies in the penumbra of
24
the rule, interpretation cannot resolve the case. Interpretation
discerns linguistic meaning, but when a text is vague, then the
output of interpretation (the semantic content of the text) is
vague. In such cases, we might say that interpretation makes its
exit and construction enters the scene. In cases where the text is
vague and the resolution of the particular dispute requires the
the courts might be required to adopt a construction that favors the executive over the
legislative branch, or vice versa.
23. JAMES B. THAYER, THE ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1893).
24. John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport seem to believe that interpretation can
resolve vagueness. They argue as follows:
Vagueness might be limited to situations where it is equally likely whether or
not a term extends to a proposed application. By contrast, vagueness might be
defined to encompass situations in which there are plausible arguments that a
term both extends and does not extend to an application, even though the
evidence for one of the positions is stronger. As with the definition of
ambiguity, the equally likely definition seems unlikely to occur often and the
plausible definition seems weak, since it might not be regarded as real
vagueness.
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 774. Their argument raises questions about the
nature of vagueness that cannot be explored in depth on this occasion. The account of
vagueness that I offered differentiates vagueness from ambiguity in precisely the respect
in which McGinnis and Rappaport believe that vagueness and ambiguity are alike. I
believe that the meaning of “vagueness” requires that vague words or phrases have
borderline cases, where the word or phrase neither clearly applies nor clearly does not
apply. McGinnis and Rappaport believe that vague expressions can always have a
linguistic meaning that draws a bright line and, hence, provides (in theory) a bright line.
On this occasion, I would simply observe that this account of vagueness will face
difficulties in accounting for a variety of well-known linguistic phenomena. For example,
if I were to say “please do not invite any tall men to my birthday party,” the McGinnis
and Rappaport account demands that the linguistic meaning of that utterance somehow
contain a bright line, i.e., 6’0”, such that every man is either tall or not tall. But this
simply does not seem to track the way vague words and phrases work in actual natural
languages. As the word “tall” is ordinarily used in English, its linguistic meaning simply
does not include a bright line, and interpreting my hypothetical utterance as containing
such a bright line would misconstrue its actual meaning.
Of course, there may be some words and phrases that are ambiguous as between
vague and nonvague senses. For example, it is possible that, in some contexts of
utterance, the word “tall” refers to a technical meaning that does draw a bright line. But
the possibility that seeming vagueness can be resolved in this way does not entail the
necessity that it can always be so resolved.
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court to draw a line, the dispute-resolving work is being done by
construction. Construction comes to the fore, and the prior work
done by interpretation recedes into the background.
Constitutional construction might also become noticeable in
a variety of other contexts. For example, it is at least
theoretically possible that a legal text could contain gaps or
contradictions. If two provisions of a given text (e.g., a contract,
statute, or constitution) have semantic content such that the
corresponding legal rules would contradict each other, then
construction might resolve the contradiction—perhaps on the
basis of an argument from the overall structure of the text, or
from the purposes that could be attributed to the relevant
provisions. Likewise, if there were a constitutional issue on
which the text was silent, then a construction might fill the gap.
Similarly, it is theoretically possible that there are some
ambiguities that cannot be resolved by interpretation. For
example, it could be the case that the available evidence about
linguistic usage and context is simply not sufficient to reveal the
25
public meaning of the provision. Or it might be the case that a
text was deliberately written in ambiguous language, perhaps
because the drafters could not agree on some point and decided
to paper over their disagreement with ambiguous language that
would kick the can down the road for resolution by subsequent
construction. If there were such irreducible ambiguities, then
their resolution would require construction.
So far, I have been discussing the situations in which
construction is obvious or noticeable. But construction also
occurs in situations where it is overlooked or invisible,because
interpretation has already done the work. Theoretically, this
occurs when doctrine mirrors the semantic content of the text.
For example, the Constitution provides: “The Senate of the
United States shall be composed of two Senators from each
state.” Our constitutional practice on this question is settled—
the rule of constitutional law corresponds exactly to the
25. John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport characterized construction
differently—stating that it is the view of constructionists (including the author this Essay)
that construction occurs whenever the text is either vague or ambiguous:
“Constructionists—theorists who adhere to the distinction between interpretation and
construction—believe that interpretation governs situations when the original meaning
of a constitutional provision is clear, whereas construction governs situations when the
original meaning is ambiguous or vague.” McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 772.
My view is that ambiguities can usually be resolved by interpretation (on the basis of the
context of utterance), although it is at least theoretically possible that some ambiguities
cannot be so resolved.
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26

linguistic meaning of the written Constitution. In other words,
this is a case where the legal content of constitutional doctrine is
equivalent to the semantic content of the text.
In other cases, the semantic content of the text constrains
but does not fully specify the legal content of constitutional
doctrine. Once again, Hart’s picture of core and penumbra is
helpful: the semantic content determines the core of constitutional doctrine, but other factors determine the shape of
doctrines in the penumbra. In both cases, construction is at
work, but construction in the core seems as if it is more or less
27
automatic (or even seemingly “mechanical” ) and, hence,
opaque or invisible. Construction in the penumbra requires
resort to some theory or principle that is outside the
constitutional text. Hence, construction in the penumbra
involves judgment or choice and is obvious or noticeable.
We can call the zone of underdeterminacy in which
construction (that goes beyond direct translation of semantic
content into legal content) is required for application “the
construction zone.” The size of the construction zone will vary
from text to text. Some legal texts are drafted in language that
supplies bright line rules; other texts use general, abstract, and
vague language that frequently requires construction that goes
beyond mere translation of semantic content into legal content.
For example, the United States Constitution contains provisions
of both sorts. The provision that specifies that each State shall
have two senators can be translated directly into practice: state
legislators provide for election of two senators, not less and not
more. But other provisions of the constitution may require
extensive work in the construction zone: “due process of law,”
“the executive power of the United States,” and “freedom of
speech” are framed in abstract, general, and vague language.

26. There may be possible cases where even the two-senators-per-state rule could
not be translated directly into a corresponding rule of constitutional law. For example, if
some science-fiction catastrophe resulted in a state with only one citizen, it is possible
that the two-senators-per-state-rule would be modified. The existence of such
possibilities is perfectly consistent with the idea that the legal content of constitutional
doctrine mirrors the semantic content of the text in situations that actually arose and
seem likely to arise in the future.
27. The notion that law cannot be mechanical is widely accepted following Roscoe
Pound’s famous article. See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV.
605 (1908). My claim in text is that construction can seem mechanical because the legally
correct construction will seem obvious to competent legal practitioners. Whether
construction can actually be mechanical is a different question, the answer to which
would depend on what is meant by “mechanical” in this context.
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IV. OBJECTIONS
These remarks do not provide the occasion for a systematic
justification or defense of the interpretation-construction
distinction. Nonetheless, I shall say a few words about some of
the objections that might be posed.
A. THE PERSUASIVE DEFINITION OBJECTION
One possible objection would focus on the idea that the
interpretation-construction distinction involves a fallacy of
persuasive definition. Originalists use the distinction to mark the
difference between the Originalist enterprise of determining the
linguistic meaning of the Constitution—constitutional
interpretation—and the nonoriginalist enterprise of specifying
the content of constitutional doctrine where the Constitution is
vague
(or
otherwise
underdeterminate)—constructional
construction. (??? Error) It might seem that the point of the
distinction is to argue that constitutional interpretation must be
28
Originalist by definitional fiat.
28. Andrew Coan made this argument. See Andrew B. Coan, The Irrelevance of
Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation, 158 U. PENN. L. REV. 1025, 1077–83 (2010).
Here is the core of his statement of the argument:
The first is the claim that interpretation simply is the search for original
meaning. As we have seen already, it is difficult to make sense of this claim as a
matter of descriptive analysis. It is easy, however, to make sense of it as an
instance of persuasive definition. In fact, it tracks the three core features of
persuasive definition perfectly.
First, interpretation is a vague term that is commonly applied to a wide variety
of quite different activities. It certainly can and often does refer to the search
for a document’s original meaning, as originalists would have it. But, as
discussed earlier, it is also commonly used to describe a wide range of practices
that have little or nothing to do with the search for original meaning. What
these varied activities have in common, if anything, is unclear but not
particularly important for present purposes. The important point is that the
term interpretation is used flexibly and expansively with no clear line
distinguishing its literal and metaphorical uses. For this reason, it is relatively
easy for a narrow definition of interpretation, emphasizing one easily
recognizable subset of interpretive practice, to pass as merely clarificatory or
descriptive--perhaps even to its proponents. Where the precise bounds of a term
are unclear, it is more difficult to detect when they have been moved or crossed.
Second, interpretation has strong positive associations in the context of
constitutional decisionmaking, especially constitutional decisionmaking by
judges. Indeed the idea that judges should interpret, rather than make or
change, the Constitution is so closely and instinctively associated with core
values of our legal system as to be practically axiomatic. This makes the term
“interpretation” a valuable prize indeed in normative constitutional discourse.
If originalists can appropriate it for themselves, they will have succeeded in
placing their theoretical opponents in a very tight rhetorical spot. Who, in the
contemporary American legal culture, wants to argue that judges in
constitutional cases should do something other than interpret the Constitution?
Perhaps a few contrarian (or tone-deaf) academics, but certainly no one else.
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That argument is mistaken. From the point of view of legal
theory, the terminology is arbitrary. For example, we could
redescribe the distinction using alternative terminology: we
might distinguish between “constructive interpretation” and
“linguistic interpretation” or between “interpretation in the
semantic sense” and “interpretation in the applicative sense.”
The important point is that there is a real difference between the
activity that this Essay calls “interpretation,” and the activity
that this Essay calls “construction.” That is, there is a real
difference between linguistic meaning and legal effect, and
between semantic content and legal content. That real difference
would remain if the vocabulary were changed.
One more point here. Originalists did not invent the
interpretation-construction distinction. It has a long pedigree in
legal usage—the distinction appears in contract law, the law of
trusts and wills, patent law, and in constitutional law, as well.
The distinction can be traced back at least as far as Franz
29
Lieber’s 1839 text, Legal and Political Hermeneutics. And
distinguished scholars in a variety of doctrinal fields discussed
30
it. For the distinction to be an example of the persuasive
31
definition fallacy, in the sense specified by C.L. Stevenson,
there must have been an attempt to covertly substitute a
stipulated definition for ordinary usage, but that has not
happened in the case of this distinction. The distinction arose
before contemporary debates about Originalism in constitutional
theory and plain meaning in statutory interpretation. The point
of the interpretation-construction distinction is to clarify
debates, not to assume their conclusions.

Id. at 1081–82. I believe that Coan’s argument is both uncharitable and flatly mistaken as
applied to the major originalist theorists who embraced the interpretation-construction
distinction. Whatever the merits of the argument as addressed to others, it is clear that it
has no force as applied to the explication of the interpretation-construction distinction in
this essay.
29. FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 55–82 (Roy M.
Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., Wm. S. Hein & Co. 1970) (1839), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=_wwAAAAAYAAJ&dq=lieber+interpretation+cons
truction&source=gbs_navlinks_s.
30. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 200 (1981); 3 ARTHUR L.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 534, at 7–15 (1960); 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.7, at 255–56 (2d ed. 1998); Edwin W. Patterson, The
Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833 (1964); Keith A.
Rowley, Contract Construction and Interpretation: From the “Four Corners” to Parol
Evidence (and Everything in Between), 69 MISS. L.J. 73 (1999); Richard F. Storrow,
Judicial Discretion and the Disappearing Distinction Between Will Interpretation and
Construction, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 65 (2005);.
31. C.L. Stevenson, Persuasive Definitions, 47 MIND 331 (1938).
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B. THE REDUCTION OF LINGUISTIC MEANING TO LEGAL
EFFECT
A second response to the interpretation-construction
distinction might claim that the semantic meaning of legal texts,
in general (and the Constitution, in particular), simply is the
legal meaning of the associated doctrines. In other words, it
might be argued that linguistic meaning (semantic content) can
be reduced to legal effect (legal content). Although one can
imagine heroic efforts to redeem this claim, it is surely
implausible on its face. For example, we can talk about a
divergence between the rules of constitutional law and the
linguistic meaning of the constitutional text, but such talk would
be mistaken and even absurd if it were a conceptual truth that
32
the legal content simply is the semantic content. Similarly, we
can investigate the linguistic meaning of a legal text that is no
longer in force, or that was never enacted, but if the claim that
semantic and legal content are identical were true, such
33
investigations would be senseless —the equivalent of an attempt
34
to investigate the nature of phlogiston.
This point is an important one, and it can be illustrated
clearly by a familiar example. Take the case of a will that may
violate the rule against perpetuities. When a lawyer or judge is
analyzing the will, the first step is interpretation: what is the
linguistic meaning of the text? If the will does (as a matter of
linguistic fact) contain a provision that would create perpetuity,
the next step requires construction—determining the legal effect
of the will. In some cases, the will may be given a saving
35
construction (or reformation). The second step is construction:
what legal effect shall be given to the will? In answer to this
question, the court can substitute a provision that matches the
semantic content of the will as closely as possible without
32. Notice that the assertion that the semantic content is identical to the legal
content is not the same as the assertion that the semantic content determines (or even
wholly determines) legal content. There may be cases in which the semantic content of a
legal text wholly determines the legal content of the legal doctrine associated with the
text (and, hence, the legal effects of the text), but, in such cases, the linguistic meaning
and the legal effect are two distinct entities.
33. If the semantic content of an inoperative legal text were equivalent to the legal
effect or legal content, then the inoperative text would have no meaning (since, by
definition, inoperative legal texts have no legal effect). This would lead to some very odd
consequences. For example, proposed legislation is not legally operative and, therefore,
would have no linguistic meaning.
34. CHARLES SINGER, A SHORT HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC IDEAS TO 1900, at 281
(1959).
35. See Hochberg v. Proctor, 805 N.E.2d 979, 984 (2004).
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violating the rule against perpetuities. The claim that the
linguistic meaning of a legal text just is its legal meaning requires
that we see cases like this in a very odd and counterintuitive way.
If the linguistic meaning of the will were the legal meaning, then
there would be no perpetuities problem and no need for a saving
construction. But our understanding of cases like this is that the
linguistic meaning of the text did create a perpetuities problem,
and that the saving construction was not part of that linguistic
meaning, but was, instead, something that the court did to the
will. The theory that semantic content and legal content are
identical does not save the appearances, because it suggests that
ordinary ways of talking about legal texts are radically mistaken.
John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport proposed an
ingenuous version of the reduction argument. They argue that
the linguistic meaning of the Constitution is determined by both
general linguistic facts (conventional semantic meanings and
regularities of syntax and grammar) and by legal facts (the
canons of interpretation and construction that exist at the time a
given provision is framed and ratified). Here is their statement
of the argument:
Originalists argue that the Constitution’s meaning is fixed as
of the time of enactment. Originalists—both of the original
intent and original meaning variety—argue that modern
interpreters should be guided by the word meanings and rules
of grammar that existed when the Constitution was enacted.
But word meanings and grammatical rules do not exhaust the
historical material relevant to constitutional interpretation.
There are also interpretive rules, defined as rules that provide
guidance on how to interpret the language in a document. It is
our position that Originalism requires modern interpreters to
follow the original interpretive rules used by the enactors of
the Constitution as much as the original word meanings or
36
rules of grammar.

This version of the argument does not commit the logical
mistake of conflating semantic content and legal content.
Instead, it argues that legal rules of interpretation and
construction are, themselves, a special kind of linguistic fact that
operates causally to create a perfect correspondence between
linguistic meanings and legal effects.
A full answer to this objection is outside the scope of this
Essay, but, given the importance of the point to the viability of
36.

McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 756.
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the interpretation-construction distinction, a brief discussion is
appropriate.
The relationship between the canons of interpretation and
construction that are applied to legal texts and the legal meaning
of those texts is complex. My discussion of that relationship
begins by applying the interpretation-construction distinction to
the canons themselves. This enables us to see that canons (or
rules, or principles) of construction can actually be sorted into
two kinds—canons of interpretation and canons of construction.
Canons of interpretation are rules of thumb—they point
judges and other legal actors to facts about the way language
works and to reliable procedures for making inferences about
linguistic meaning. For example, as a rule of thumb, when we are
faced with two possible readings of a text, and one reading
makes part of the text superfluous, we can infer that the reading
that would result in each and every provision adding meaning is
37
more likely to be the correct reading. But this is only a rule of
thumb that summarize a general linguistic regularity (intuitively
38
grasped by competent users of the language). There could be
evidence that suggests that the redundancy was intentional—for
emphasis, or to guard against misinterpretation.
Canons of construction operate differently. A canon of
construction guides the process by which linguistic meaning is
translated into legal effect. The so-called “substantive” canons
are clear examples of canons of construction. For example, the
avoidance canon tells judges to construe statutory language so as
39
to avoid constitutional issues. The point of this canon is not
linguistic accuracy. Rather, the avoidance canon makes a
difference precisely in those cases in which the ordinary
linguistic meaning of a statute would create a constitutional
issue.
Consider now the relationship between the two different
kinds of canons and the argument that methods of interpretation
are analogous to rules of grammar and syntax. It is clear that
37. See Wash. Mkt. Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112 (1879) (“It is a cardinal rule of
statutory construction that significance and effect shall, if possible, be accorded to every
word.”); Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish Cnty., 829 P.2d 746, 751–52 (1992) (“Statutes
should not be interpreted in such a manner as to render any portion meaningless,
superfluous or questionable.”).
38. Cf. Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 245 (2008) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (observing that some canons of interpretation “simply crystallize what
English speakers already know”).
39. See generally William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a ThreeBranch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831 (2001).
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canons of interpretation are not constitutive of meaning—they
are mere rules of thumb. But the linguistic regularities that we
call “rules” of syntax and grammar are constitutive: these
linguistic regularities enable individual words and phrases to
combine in complex ways. It would be a conceptual mistake to
conflate the distinction between these two different roles.
What about canons of construction? Do they function in a
way that is relevantly similar to the rules of grammar and syntax
in the production of the linguistic meaning of legal texts? Once
we attend to the actual way these canons function, it becomes
apparent that they do not. The substantive canons, such as the
avoidance canon, are parasitic on the interpretation-construction
distinction. They assume that linguistic meaning is distinction
from legal effect: they operate as general rules or principles that
operate on semantic content to produce legal content. Thus, the
existence of canons of construction actually is evidence that
counts in favor of the existence of the interpretationconstruction distinction.
For this reason, McGinnis and Rappaport’s argument does
not establish that linguistic meaning reduces to legal meaning (as
determined by original methods), or that semantic content is
identical to legal content (again, as determined by original
methods). But the fact that their argument does not establish
reduction in general does not imply that legal conventions
governing interpretation never operate to determine linguistic
meaning. One can easily imagine examples where the linguistic
meaning of an utterance would be, in part, determined by a
specialized legal convention that might be called a canon of
interpretation or construction. Such examples are most plausible
in cases where the authoritative legal text is addressed to a
specialized audience of legal practitioners (e.g., the more
technical provisions of the Internal Revenue Code). But the fact
that legal conventions sometimes can determine linguistic
meaning does not imply that they always must play this role.
C. THE IRRELEVANCE OF SEMANTIC CONTENT OBJECTION
A third response to the interpretation-construction
distinction might employ the method of confession and
avoidance: yes, there is a distinction between the linguistic
meaning of the constitutional text and constitutional doctrine,
but the linguistic meaning is simply irrelevant, as far as the law is
concerned. Once again, we can imagine heroic efforts to make
good on this claim. For example, it might be argued that the
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linguistic meaning of the text is radically indeterminate: if this
were the case, then all the work of shaping constitutional
doctrine would be done by construction. It is far from clear that
claims of the radical indeterminacy of language are even
40
plausible, much less correct.
A more modest version of the irrelevance criticism might
claim that, even when the language of legal texts is neither vague
nor ambiguous, legal doctrine may depart from the language.
There are situations in which this seems to be the case. The First
Amendment says “Congress shall make no law,” but this
provision applies to executive and judicial action. Much needs to
be said about such cases, but, on this occasion, I will offer only
one observation. Neither the existence of such examples in some
cases, nor the theoretical possibility that all provisions might be
construed to create doctrines that are inconsistent with the text,
implies the irrelevance of the interpretation-construction
distinction. It seems obvious that the linguistic meaning of the
text is (at the very least) an important consideration in the
development of constitutional doctrine. So long as the semantic
content of legal texts contributes (in some nontrivial way) to
legal content, thereby making a difference to the legal effect of
the texts, the distinction between interpretation and construction
is at least relevant to legal practice.
V. THE INDISPENSABILITY OF THE INTERPRETATIONCONSTRUCTION DISTINCTION
Although the main point of this short Essay is simply to
explicate the interpretation-construction distinction, I also want
to say a few words about the distinction’s importance or value.
In particular, I want to advance the strong claim that the
distinction is indispensible—that legal theory cannot do without
this claim. Of course, when I say “indispensible,” I mean to use
that term in its normative sense: if we try to do legal theory
without the distinction between semantic content and legal
content, our theories will be defective—they will not capture the
real structure of the processes by which authoritative legal texts
are explicated and applied. One more caveat: although the
distinction between “interpretation” and “construction” is
indispensible, those particular words are being used in a

40. Solum, supra note 21 (discussing the claim that law is radically indeterminate).
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technical sense. A different vocabulary could be used to describe
the distinction.
Why do I believe that the interpretation-construction
distinction is something that legal theorists must acknowledge?
Another way of framing the question might be this: what is the
payoff of the interpretation-construction distinction? The answer
to this question focuses on conceptual clarity: without the
interpretation-construction distinction, our thinking about law
will necessarily be confused. To see why this is the case, we can
return to constitutional theory—and the debate between
41
Originalists and Living Constitutionalists.
Originalists assert that the meaning of the Constitution is
the original public meaning of the text: in the case of the
Constitution of 1789, that means that the meaning of the text is a
function of the conventional semantic meaning of the words,
phrases, and patterns of usage (rules of syntax and grammar)
that prevailed at the time these provisions of the Constitution
were framed and ratified. Living constitutionalists understand
themselves to be disagreeing with Originalists. They argue that
the meaning of the Constitution must and should adapt to
changing circumstances and values. As we all know, this debate
has been going on for quite some time, and it seems to have
resulted in what we might call “dialectical impasse”—with each
side absolutely certain that the other side is making a huge
mistake (perhaps the product of stupidity, ingenuousness, or bad
faith).
But once we have the interpretation-construction distinction
at hand, it turns out that some of the apparent disagreement
between Originalism and Living Constitutionalism dissolves, and
that the remainder is reconfigured. The core of Originalism is a
theory of constitutional interpretation: Originalists claim that the
linguistic meaning of the constitution is fixed by linguistic facts at
the time that each constitutional provision is framed and ratified.
Most Originalists also affirm a partial theory of constitutional
construction: they claim that the legal content of constitutional
doctrine should be constrained by the linguistic content of the
text. To simplify for purposes of exposition, Originalists believe
that the legal content of constitutional doctrine must be
consistent with the semantic content of the constitutional text—

41. This discussion adapts remarks in Semantic Originalism. See Solum, supra note
2.
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although there may be special circumstances in which
inconsistencies are allowed.
Living constitutionalism, on the other hand, is primarily a
theory of constitutional construction. Living constitutionalists
believe that the legal content of constitutional doctrine must
change with changing circumstances and values. Although there
may be Living Constitutionalists who believe that that the
commitment to change in constitutional doctrine requires them
to deny that the linguistic content of the Constitution is fixed,
that belief is obviously false. Even if the linguistic meaning of the
Constitution is fixed (as originalists recognize), the content of
constitutional doctrine can grow and change over time (as it
obviously does). One reason for this phenomenon is the fact of
constitutional underdeterminacy: many constitutional provisions
are general, abstract, and vague. “Legislative power” and
“freedom of speech” are examples. When a legal provision is
vague, then semantic content underdetermines legal content.
Thus, a variety of specific rules regarding prior restraints could
be consistent with the linguistic meaning of the First
Amendment, and these specific rules could change over time.
Once the interpretation-construction distinction is
recognized, it becomes apparent that some (and perhaps even
many) aspects of the debate between Originalists and Living
Constitutionalists are the product of conceptual confusion. In
fact, some forms of living constitutionalism may actually be
compatible with some forms of originalism. If Living
Constitutionalists are willing to live within what we can call “the
construction zone”—the zone of indeterminacy created by the
general, abstract, and vague provisions of the Constitution—they
can embrace the notion that the linguistic meaning of the
constitutional text was fixed at the time of framing and
ratification. If Originalists are willing to accept that
constitutional doctrine should and must change over time within
the limits imposed by the original meaning of the text, then they
can accept a constrained version of Living Constitutionalism.
I said that some forms of living constitutionalism might be
consistent with some forms of originalism. Other forms of these
two theories may be inconsistent. For example, if some Living
Constitutionalists believe that the linguistic meaning of the text
does not, in any way, constrain the content of legal doctrine,
then those Living Constitutionalists wholly reject originalism.
Likewise, if some Originalists believe (in my opinion,
mistakenly) that there are no vague provisions in the
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Constitution, then those Originalists might wholly reject living
constitutionalism.
For our purposes, the point is that the true shape of the
debate between Originalists and Living Constitutionalists only
comes into view when we acknowledge the interpretationconstruction distinction and the related distinctions between
vagueness and ambiguity, and between semantic content and
legal content. A similar point might be made about
contemporary debates about statutory interpretation and
construction. Advocates of “plain meaning” are concerned with
interpretation—with the notion that the linguistic meaning of a
statute should constrain the range of acceptable constructions.
Advocates of “purposivism” or “dynamic interpretation” are
focused on construction: their position could be reformulated as
the claim that the construction of statutes should be guided by
purposes, and the further notion that some normative justified
constructions may override the linguistic meaning of the
statutory text, in some range of circumstances.
CONCLUSION
I hope to have accomplished two tasks. The first and most
important of these is simply to explicate the interpretationconstruction distinction—to say what that distinction is. The
second task is to give a sense of the importance of the
distinction—to say something about the role it must and should
play in legal theory. Of course, this leaves many important
questions of legal practice unanswered. In particular, I did not
tackle the question, “when should construction override the
linguistic meaning of an authoritative legal text?” But I hope
that I demonstrated that the question is clearer and more
perspicuous if it is asked in that way.

